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NOT SO MEANINGFUL ANYMORE: WHY A LAW LIBRARY IS
REQUIRED TO MAKE A PRISONER'S ACCESS TO THE
COURTS MEANINGFUL
INTRODUCTION
All citizens of the United States enjoy a right to meaningful
access to the judicial system. Courts must be especially vigilant in
protecting this right to access for groups who, because of prejudice,
societal indifference, or a lack of resources, have trouble gaining
meaningful access to the courts for themselves.' In an effort to
protect this right, the Supreme Court has struck down laws and
policies that have denied citizens access to the courts based on such
factors as race, sex, and wealth. The Supreme Court has also
recognized and protected the right of prisoners to have meaningful
access to the judicial system.2 For prisoners, the Court has charac-
terized meaningful access as including the provision of an adequate
law library or the assistance of trained legal personnel.'
While the right to meaningful access ensures that no citizen is
unjustly denied the right to get into court, standing is the constitu-
tional gatekeeping mechanism courts use to keep potential litigants
out of court.4 Courts have continually recognized the three con-
stitutional requirements plaintiffs must satisfy to demonstrate
standing: (1) "injury in fact" or actual injury must exist; (2) the
1. See Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children
in Civil Litigation, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1571,1605-07 (1996) (classifying children, prisoners,
and the mentally disabled as among the groups whose vulnerability jeopardizes their access
to the courts).
2. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that a prisoner's right to
meaningful access placed an affirmative duty on prison officials to provide adequate legal
resources).
3. Id.
4. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.5.1,
at 60-62 (2d ed. 2002).
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injury must be "fairly traceable" to the alleged violation; and (3) the
court must be capable of redressing the injury.5
The Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. Casey6 shows a con-
vergence of the two opposing forces mentioned above: prisoners
asserting their right to meaningful access to the judicial system,
and the Court using the gatekeeping mechanism of standing to keep
those prisoners, and future prisoners, from arguing the merits of
their case in court. Lewis involved a class of prisoners in Arizona
claiming that inadequacies in the state prison libraries caused a
deprivation of their rights to meaningful access to the courts.7 The
district court, in granting the prisoners' requested relief, recognized
inadequacies involving "the training of library staff,... the updating
of legal materials, ... [and] the availability of photocopying
services."8
Resting its decision on the actual injury requirement of standing,
the Supreme Court held that to show actual injury an "inmate ...
must go one step further [beyond claiming an inadequate library
or inadequate legal assistance] and demonstrate that the alleged
shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered
his efforts to pursue a legal claim."9 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia suggested that a prisoner would have to allege
something equivalent to having prepared a complaint that "was
dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which,
because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he
could not have known."10
Although a number of publications have looked to Lewis when
criticizing the Court's standing jurisprudence," there is a dearth
of material providing a detailed examination of the Court's inter-
pretation of the right to meaningful access. Examining the right to
meaningful access, and how a law library is essential to a prisoner's
5. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
6. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
7. Id. at 346.
8. Id. at 346-47 (citing the district court's opinion).
9. Id. at 351.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis,
82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 321-22 (2002); David Steinberger, Note, Lewis v. Casey, Tightening the
Boundaries of Prisoner Access to the Courts?, 18 PACE L. REV. 377 (1998).
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exercise of that right, provides strong evidence supporting those
who have criticized the Court's standing analysis in Lewis.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis is
flawed in its characterization of the right to meaningful access and
actual injury for the purpose of standing, as well as suggests the
standards that are necessary to protect the constitutional rights of
prisoners. Part I of this Note begins by examining the right to
meaningful access to the courts. The initial focus will be on the
right's development and general meaning. This Note concentrates
on Supreme Court precedent invalidating laws or policies that
amount to the State placing a direct or indirect bar on the access
of certain indigent groups. Especially important will be the Court's
assertions that, when the government provides a certain type of
access to the courts, a policy that, in effect, makes this access
unattainable for the indigent, there is a violation of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After looking at the right generally, this Note focuses on the
right as it relates to prisoners specifically, with emphasis on the
right to a law library or its equivalent. This Note argues that the
Court's meaningful access precedent in the area of prisoners'
rights is consistent with its decisions concerning the right gener-
ally. This consistency derives from holdings finding impermissible
those policies barring indigent prisoners from access that is
attainable by wealthier prisoners. Part I concludes by looking at
how the Court's decision in Lewis limited this right to access.
Part II analyzes the application of the standing doctrine, focusing
on the actual injury requirement. This Part analyzes which injuries
are personal and sufficient to confer standing, and discusses the
requirement of imminent future harm.
Part III argues that the Lewis decision was wrongly decided
both in its characterization of the right to meaningful access to the
judicial system, and in its finding that the plaintiffs did not meet
the actual injury requirement of standing. Focusing on this
necessity of a law library in allowing a prisoner to discover legal
claims, the Note argues that without an adequate law library or
adequate alternative an indigent prisoner is essentially barred from
accessing the courts. In essence, failing to provide an adequate law
library violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses by
20041 1197
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placing a bar on the access of certain prisoners because of their
indigency.
Admittedly, prisoners must have an interest in reaching the
courts that justifies constitutional protection against a complete bar
from access. For that reason, Part III also examines the interests at
play in prisoner litigation, and attempts to demonstrate that those
interests are of comparable importance to those that the Court has
recognized in its meaningful access jurisprudence. The focus will be
on habeas claims and § 1983 claims regarding prison conditions.
In discussing the Court's standing decision, the Note argues that
the Lewis Court's elevated standard is inappropriate under both
characterizations of the right to meaningful access-the standard
for which this Note argues (one which includes a law library or
adequate alternative), as well as the characterization of meaningful
access the Court used in Lewis. Following discussion of how the
Court erred in its decision, Part IV of this Note discusses the
consequences of these errors and suggests a proper remedy in cases
where the government has denied prisoners their right to meaning-
ful access.
I. RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO THE COURTS
A. Background
To understand how the Court misconstrued the right to meaning-
ful access in Lewis, one must understand the purpose and scope of
the right in general. Boddie v. Connecticut2 and Griffin v. Illinois3
provide helpful illustrations of the Supreme Court's right to access
precedent.
In Boddie, an indigent couple challenged a filing fee of approxi-
mately sixty dollars that the State required to obtain a divorce. " In
invalidating the law as it applied to indigent couples who could not
obtain a divorce for the sole reason that they could not pay the filing
fee, the Court held "that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that these appellants be afforded an opportu-
12. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
13. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
14. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 372.
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nity to go into court to obtain a divorce." 5 The Court considered the
fact that Connecticut had "blocked access to the judicial process" to
be a violation of the Constitution.1
6
Much of the Court's logic in Boddie rested on its decision in
Griffin v. Illinois. Justice Black framed the issue in Griffin as
"whether Illinois may, consistent with the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, administer this
statute so as to deny adequate appellate review to the poor while
granting such review to all others." v In striking down the state
statute, Justice Black noted that although the right to an appeal
is not a constitutional guarantee, a state cannot provide access
to some citizens, but then, through the imposition of fees, place a
bar on the same access, effectively preventing the indigent from
enjoying it.18
B. Prison Context
1. A Prisoner's Right to Access Pre-Bounds
Long before Lewis, courts recognized that prisoners had a right
to meaningful access to the judicial system. The Supreme Court in
particular had consistently recognized the right to access for
prisoners. 9 Ex parte Hull is one of the first examples in which the
Supreme Court affirmed a prisoner's right to access.2 ° In Hull, the
Court invalidated a prison regulation that impeded a prisoner's
15. Id. at 382.
16. Id.
17. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. The statute to which the Court referred required a transcript
for filing an appeal in criminal cases. Id. at 13-14. Payment of a fee, by the defendant, was
necessary in order to obtain the transcripts. Id. at 14.
18. See id. at 18.
[A) State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts
or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a State that does
grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates against some
convicted defendants on account of their poverty.
Id. (citation omitted). The Court declared this type of statute a violation of equal protection
and due process. Id.
19. See, e.g., Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam); Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483 (1969); Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
20. See Hull, 312 U.S. at 549 ("[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair [a
prisoner's] right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.").
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ability to file for a writ of habeas corpus.2' This holding ensures a
right for prisoners to access the federal courts for the purpose of
filing habeas corpus petitions." Although Hull established that
prisoners had a right to access the judicial system, the Court
stopped short of requiring an affirmative duty on prison officials to
help inmates secure that access.23
In another case that illustrated the right to meaningful access
in the prison context, the Supreme Court indicated that in some
situations, prison officials may have an affirmative duty to help
inmates access the courts.24 In Johnson v. Avery, the Court inval-
idated a prison regulation prohibiting prisoners from helping other
prisoners prepare court papers.25 The petitioner had helped other
prisoners file petitions for writs of habeas corpus.26 Referring to the
importance of providing assistance to help illiterate prisoners draft
petitions for habeas corpus, the Court observed, "it is fundamental
that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting
their complaints may not be denied or obstructed."27 Critical to
the Court's holding was that the State had failed to provide ade-
quate alternatives to the assistance of fellow prisoners for those
inmates who needed help in filing their claims.28 In invalidating the
prison regulation forbidding prisoner assistance, the Johnson Court
21. See id. In invalidating the prison regulation, Hull necessarily established the right
to file a habeas corpus petition as essential to the right to access the courts.
22. For the purposes of this Note, it is important to recognize that the Court in Hull
declared the regulation invalid despite the fact that only one prisoner had challenged the
policy, claiming that it had hindered his efforts to file a habeas petition. See id. at 547. This
means that the Hull decision established a precedent that when a right that is an essential
component of meaningful access is violated, the policy causing the violation of that right
must be invalidated without regard to how many inmates can demonstrate how the policy
hindered them.
23. See id. at 549.
24. See Johnson, 393 U.S. at 483.
25. Id. at 490.
26. See id. at 484.
27. Id. at 485.
28. See id. at 488-90. In this particular case, the Court found that the prison's provision
of free notarization service, prisoner access to attorney lists and the warden's occasional
telephone call to the public defender on behalf of an inmate were not adequate means to
assist prisoners in filing their claims. Because no adequate alternative to prisoner assistance
existed, the regulation forbidding such assistance could not stand. The Court's opinion noted
that the prison policy would not have offended the Constitution had the prison taken
affirmative steps to help ensure access for inmates. See id. at 490.
1200 [Vol. 45:1195
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recognized adequate legal assistance as an indispensable element
of meaningful access to the system.
2. Bounds: Adequate Library or Adequate Assistance
Following the precedent of Johnson and similar cases,29 the
Supreme Court established that a state has an affirmative duty to
assist prisoners in their access to the judicial system. 0 In Bounds
v. Smith, the Court affirmed a state's obligation to provide an
adequate law library or acceptable alternative to guarantee an
inmate's right to meaningful access to the judicial system."' The
Court found that the necessary components to exercise a right to
access recognized in pre-Bounds cases depended on an adequate
prison law library or, in the alternative, adequate legal assistance.32
The Court used the example of a practicing attorney drafting a civil
rights complaint without the use of a law library to show the
importance of the law library or alternative assistance in providing
meaningful access.33
It is helpful to use the right to file a habeas corpus petition,
which Hull established as being a necessary component of the right
29. Several cases require an affirmative duty on the State to provide access to the court
for prisoners. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that the right to
counsel extends to any offense for which one may be imprisoned); Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam) (affirming a district court decision enjoining the implementation
of a California policy that provided inadequate legal materials for the prisoners); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the right to counsel for criminally accused
as a fundamental right obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment); Smith v.
Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (finding that a state requirement that an indigent prisoner pay
a filing fee for writ of habeas corpus denied him equal protection of the laws); Burns v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 252 (1959) (holding that a state could not constitutionally require a convicted
indigent to pay a filing fee before filing a motion for appeal).
30. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
31. Id. The State's duty to provide adequate law libraries or assistance is the same
component of the right to access that the prisoners in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996),
challenged.
32. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825-26. In answering the state's claim that filing a petition
for habeas corpus only requires the prisoner to state the basic facts that support his or her
cause of action, the Court stated, "it hardly follows [from the simplicity of the habeas corpus
petition or civil rights complaint] that a law library or other legal assistance is not essential
to frame such documents." Id. at 825.
33. See id. at 825 (declaring such a lawyer incompetent).
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to access,34 to demonstrate how the Court elaborated on the
necessity of law libraries or legal assistance in making access to the
courts meaningful. One benefit of law libraries or legal assistance
is that they are "[a] source of current legal information ... [that
would help prisoners] learn whether they have claims at all, as
where new court decisions might apply retroactively to invalidate
convictions."35 If the right to file a habeas corpus petition is
essential to access to the courts, and libraries or an alternative
source of legal knowledge are the only means for a prisoner to
discover whether he has a claim, how can that right to access be
meaningful if the State does not provide an adequate law library
or suitable alternative? The answer, based on Bounds, is that
access cannot be meaningful without a law library or suitable
alternative .3' Therefore, Bounds must be understood as establishing
an adequate law library or suitable alternative as a necessary
component of the right to meaningful access.
3. Lewis: The Right to Not So Meaningful Access
In Lewis v. Casey,37 the Supreme Court again addressed the
question of what states must provide prisoners to ensure meaning-
ful access to the courts. Lewis involved a class of prisoners claiming
that, due to a lack of resources and staff, the libraries in Arizona
state prisons were inadequate to provide meaningful access to the
judicial system, as guaranteed in Bounds.3" The Court rejected the
prisoners' claim on the basis that they did not have standing to
assert their claim.39
The Court's decision to deny the prisoners relief based on failure
to show standing depended on the Court's framing of the right to
34. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
35. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 826 n. 14. For an example of a decision that applied retroactively
to invalidate convictions, see McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 2-4 (1968) (holding that a
decision subsequent to a prisoner's sentencing that asserted the right to counsel in
sentencing hearings applied retroactively). Most certainly any adequate alternative to a law
library would keep a prisoner apprised of new developments in the law. Therefore, one-time
legal counseling would not suffice.
36. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.
37. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
38. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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meaningful access. In ruling against the prisoners, the Court chose
to construe narrowly the right to access the courts. 40 In limiting the
scope of Bounds, the Court held that the State had really only
negative duties, and virtually no affirmative duties, in ensuring the
right to access to the courts.4' Despite its narrow construction of the
right to meaningful access to the courts, the Lewis majority
admitted "that several statements in Bounds went beyond the right
of access recognized in the earlier cases on which it relied .... These
statements appear to suggest that the State must enable the
prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in
court."42 Finding that these "statements," which require affirmative
action by the State, were not a part of the right to meaningful
access, the majority disclaimed them.43
The right to meaningful access to the courts that emerged after
Lewis does not place any discernable affirmative obligation on the
states to ensure access for prisoners. The components of access
viewed as necessary under Bounds are no longer considered to be
so." The Lewis characterization of right to access is essentially a
mandate for keeping prisoners out of court, as they are unable to
argue that the State has infringed upon their access by not
providing them with an adequate law library or legal assistance."
40. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-51 (explaining a narrow construction of the right to access
the courts, and noting that an independent right to a law library or legal assistance does not
exist).
41. See id. at 350:
In the cases to which Bounds traced its roots, we had protected that right [of
access to the courts] by prohibiting state prison officials from actively
interfering with inmates' attempts to prepare legal documents, or file them, and
by requiring state courts to waive filing fees, or transcript fees for indigent
inmates.
(citations omitted).
42. Id. at 354 (citations omitted).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 351 ("[Plrison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in
themselves, but only the means for ensuring 'a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.'") (quoting Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)).
45. Courts have often used Lewis to keep prisoners out of court for failure to show actual
injury. See Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1998); Oliver v. Fauver,
118 F.3d 175, 176-78 (3d Cir. 1997); Ryder v. Van Ochten, No. 96-2043, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32768 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1997) (unpublished).
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The State is now prohibited only from erecting barriers that
actually interfere with a prisoner's right to access.
II. STANDING
A. The Basics of the Standing Doctrine
Standing derives from the constitutional mandate that courts
may hear only cases and controversies.46 A major goal of standing
is "to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved
through the judicial process." v To ensure that standing accom-
plishes this goal, courts have identified three constitutional
requirements necessary for bringing a case to court. Standing
requires the plaintiff to have suffered an "injury in fact," to
demonstrate some "causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of," and finally, to show the likelihood that the
court will be able to resolve the conflict in a favorable manner.4 s
As the actual injury requirement was the factor that led to the
Court's rejection of the plaintiff's claim in Lewis, it warrants further
examination. Demanding that plaintiffs show an injury is intended
to ensure "that there is an actual dispute between adverse litigants
and that the court is not being asked for an advisory opinion. "49 The
Supreme Court has often started its analysis of the injury compo-
nent of standing by looking at the plaintiff's personal interest or
stake in the issue being litigated. ° The goal of this interest analysis
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
47. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
48. Id. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
49. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 2.5.2, at 63.
50. Compare Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,616 (1973) ("The threshold question
which must be answered is whether the appellant has 'alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy ..... ") (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962)), and Ass'n
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (holding that, in
deciding standing, courts must ask "the question whether the interest sought to be protected
by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question"), with Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 739-40 (1972) (holding that even a person demonstrating a "special interest" in a claim
must show how they have been adversely affected or injured as a result of the action about
which they are complaining). Sierra Club's requirement for a "special interest" demonstrates
that the Court may be more exacting in examination of some interests as compared to others.
1204 [Vol. 45:1195
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is to determine whether the party before the court is legitimately
affected by the decision of the case, and notjust in court attempting
to obtain a judgment favorable to their values.5
Identifying a plaintiffs interest in litigation plays an important
role in determining whether a plaintiff has shown that he or she
has suffered an "'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."52 Erwin Chemerinsky
identifies the two major inquiries of the standing injury require-
ment that the Supreme Court used in deciding the Lewis case:
"What does it mean to say that a plaintiff must personally suffer an
injury; and what types of injuries are sufficient for standing?"53 The
question of injury is an easy one for the court to answer if the
plaintiff is able to state that he can "allege facts showing that he is
himself adversely affected."54 The question, however, is a more
difficult one when a plaintiff comes to court seeking an injunction
to prevent imminent harm.55
B. Which Injuries Are Personal?
A plaintiff seeking an injunction to prevent imminent harm
must convince the court that if the challenged action is not rectified,
there is a good chance he or she will experience an actual injury.
The Supreme Court provided its definition of a "good chance" in
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.5" The Lyons case involved the com-
plaint of an African American male, who was seeking an injunc-
tion to prevent police officers from using a particular type of
51. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740.
52. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted).
53. See CHEMERINSKr, supra note 4, § 2.5.2, at 64.
54. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740.
55. While this Note argues against characterizing the injury claim in Lewis this way, and
will argue that the plaintiffs rightfully alleged actual injury, this is the way the Court
analyzed the injury claim (by characterizing the injury necessary for standing as being the
loss of the opportunity to file a nonfrivolous claim). Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352-53
(1996). Because this Note argues that the Court's decision on injury is wrong even if one
characterizes the injury as imminent future harm, it is important to address the
requirements for this type of injury.
56. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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chokehold.5" The plaintiff had experienced this type of chokehold
and the complaint showed that fifteen people had died in Los
Angeles as a result of this chokehold.5 8 In rejecting Lyons' complaint
on the basis of standing, the Court held that in order to allege
imminent injury of the type to warrant injunctive relief, a plaintiff
must show "a sufficient likelihood that he will ... be wronged," or in
Lyons' particular case, "he was likely to suffer future injury from
the use of the chokeholds by. police officers." 9 Because the odds
were so low that Lyons would ever be subjected to the chokehold
again, Lyons could not convince the Court that any real threat of
additional injury existed.
C. Which Injuries Are Sufficient?
The other important question surfacing in standing decisions
in which injury is an issue is, "what injuries are sufficient?"" As
discussed previously, the plaintiffs in Lewis alleged violations of
constitutional rights, and infringements on constitutional rights
are often sufficient for a court to confer standing." Also, the general
rule is that a plaintiffs assertion of "a violation of an individual
liberty, such as freedom of speech or due process of law, will be ac-
corded standing."62 Therefore, any plaintiff alleging actual infringe-
ment of a constitutional right should have standing in court,
provided all of the other standing requirements are met. 3 Courts
consistently abide by this principle, finding that a plaintiff has
satisfied the actual injury requirements of standing if they allege
direct interference with a constitutional right.6 4
57. See id. at 97-98.
58. See id. at 100.
59. Id. at 105, 111; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)
(holding that plaintiffs challenging a change in the Endangered Species Act did not
demonstrate standing because they failed to show that they had actual plans to visit the
areas and see the animals affected by the change in the Act).
60. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 2.5.3, at 69.
61. See id. at 70.
62. See id.
63. A claim of constitutional infringement may fail to satisfy standing requirements if
the court finds the claim to be too generalized. See id. § 2.5.5, at 82-89.
64. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) (finding that standing was
implied in cases where a plaintiffalleged government infringement on the Fifth Amendment
1206 [Vol. 45:1195
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The only instance in which courts have not recognized infringe-
ment of a constitutional right as sufficient to meet the injury
requirement is where the alleged infringement does not affect the
plaintiff in a concrete manner. The line between which types of
injuries are concrete enough to confer standing is not easily
discerned. This blurred line is exemplified in the Supreme Court's
decisions determining who has standing to bring suit in alleged
violations of First Amendment rights. The Court has held consis-
tently that "[a]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat
of specific future harm."65 As one would imagine, a standard as
vague as this one has produced different findings in cases where the
factual situations appear to be quite similar.
66
III. RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL ACCESS AND STANDING: HOW THE
COURT MISCONSTRUED THE RIGHT AND THE DOCTRINE IN LEWIS
A. The Right to Meaningful Access
1. Libraries or an Adequate Alternative Form of Legal
Assistance Are the Only Means by Which Certain Prisoners Can
Access the Courts
The Court in Lewis stated that a prisoner's right to access only
requires a very limited degree of assistance from prison officials.6
Prisoners, according to the Court, do not have the right to re-
search or legal advice of any kind, but only the right to be able to
present their claims to the Court. 8 With this statement, the Court
showed that it was characterizing the right to meaningful access as
right against self-incrimination).
65. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
66. Compare Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14 (holding that plaintiffs' claim that. the Army's
intelligence activities had a "chilling" effect on their First Amendment rights did not satisfy
the concrete injury requirement of standing), with Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465,473 (1987)
(holding that plaintiffs claim that he was "deterred from exhibiting the films by a statutory
characterization of the films as 'political propaganda- was sufficient to satisfy the actual
injury requirement for an infringement on plaintiffs First Amendment rights).
67. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 360 (1996).
68. Id.
2004] 1207
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prohibiting only state action that deprives prisoners of the opportu-
nity to present their claim. For a prisoner without the ability to
contact a lawyer, state inaction (in the form of failure to provide
adequate sources of legal knowledge) creates a situation in which
the State has effectively barred the prisoner from reaching the
courts. A prisoner without knowledge of a § 1983 claim, or retroac-
tive law invalidating his conviction, is unable to access the courts
in the same way an indigent couple trying to file for divorce or a
criminal defendant without a transcript for appeal cannot gain
adequate access to the courts.69 The waiver of a fee or provision of
a transcript are both forms of affirmative action, which the Court
requires states to take. These actions are motivated by the same
logic as requiring the states to provide prisoners with adequate law
libraries or alternative assistance; specifically, removing barriers
from a person's right to access the courts. Not providing a prisoner,
who has no other means of obtaining knowledge, with information
necessary for him to become aware of claims, is essentially barring
him from having access to the courts.
For a prisoner without the ability to attain counsel the Bounds
Court recognized that anything less than a law library or an
alternative form of legal assistance (beyond making sure the
prisoner's complaints get out the door) meant that prisoners were
barred from having meaningful access to the courts. Consequently,
the Court went far beyond telling prison officials that they could not
interfere with the prisoner's filing of complaints.7 ° Bounds should
not be read as the Court in Lewis did as establishing a new
affirmative duty, but as continuing to protect the right to meaning-
ful access to the courts by striking down policies and conditions that
place barriers between the prisoner and the courts.
One reason the Lewis Court found dismissing Bounds' require-
ment of law libraries or a meaningful alternative as nonproblematic
was that it believed "[t hese elaborations upon the right of access to
69. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (holding that a filing fee
needed to obtain a divorce was unconstitutional as it denied the couple their access to the
courts); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (stating that a state must provide an
indigent criminal defendant with a trial transcript for appeal).
70. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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the courts have no antecedent in our pre-Bounds cases."' Despite
what the Court said, decisions prior to Bounds suggested the
importance of requiring the State to provide the necessary tools for
prisoners to discover potential claims. 2 Johnson v. Avery 73 served
as the starting point for the Court's recognition of the states'
affirmative duty to help prisoners access the courts. Not only did
Johnson recognize the importance of assistance to indigent
prisoners,7 4 but it suggested that certain circumstances may exist
in which a state would have some type of affirmative duty to ensure
adequate access for prisoners.75 Although the Johnson decision
certainly cannot be read as mandating a state's affirmative role in
ensuring access, it does stand for the principle that courts will
consider the actions of a state as they relate to assistance of the
state's prisoners.
In Younger v. Gilmore,6 the Court built on Johnson's foundation,
establishing an affirmative duty on the states to ensure that their
prisoners have access. Of special concern were the rights of indi-
gent prisoners, who, without the provision of legal materials or
assistance from the State, would have no access to the courts.77
This focus in Gilmore, on the state's duty to provide assistance in
the form of a law library or an adequate alternative, contradicts
the Lewis majority's contention that Bounds was the first case
to recognize a state's affirmative duty to provide prisoners with
71. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.
72. See Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners' Right to Counsel:
Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455, 460
(1989) (explaining cases prior to Bounds that held that states may not even place an indirect
burden on meaningful access, and may have to "provide affirmative help to indigent
prisoners").
73. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
74. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
75. See Johnson, 393 U.S. at 488 (holding that because "Tennessee does not provide an
available alternative to the assistance provided by other inmates" the state's prisons cannot
forbid jailhouse lawyers from helping their fellow inmates).
76. 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam). In this case the Supreme Court offered a per curiam
opinion affrming a California district court's decision. The California district court held that
prison law libraries or an adequate alternative were an essential component of meaningful
access to the courts. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 109-10 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
77. Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 109 ("[Tihe right under the equal protection clause of the
indigent and uneducated prisoner to the tools necessary to receive adequate hearing in the
courts has received special re-enforcement by the federal courts in recent decades.") (citations
omitted), affd sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
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certain assistance (in the form of a law library or alternative) to
guarantee the right to access the courts.
Another reason the Court refused to recognize law libraries or an
adequate alternative as a necessary component of meaningful
access was, "[tlo demand the conferral of such sophisticated legal
capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely illiterate
prison population is effectively to demand permanent provision of
counsel, which we do not believe the Constitution requires."78 T his
idea is inconsistent with the right to meaningful access in the
context of prisoners. The reliance of many prisoners on the assis-
tance of a "jailhouse lawyer"79 shows that the majority's concerns
about a slippery slope leading to mandating the appointment of
counsel to guarantee meaningful access were exaggerated. By
combining the holdings of Johnson and Younger one can understand
how the Court saw the concept of the jailhouse lawyer" as comple-
menting the right to an adequate law library or assistance.8" The
right to the assistance of fellow prisoners, provided for in Johnson,81
would allow prisoners to make use of the legal information the
State was required to provide under Younger.82 The interaction
of these two components of meaningful access, which the Court
deemed essential, shows that the fears the Lewis majority ex-
pressed were exaggerated and unnecessary, as indigent and
78. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996).
79. See Note, Constitutional Law: Prison "No-Assistance" Regulations and the Jailhouse
Lawyer, 1968 DUKE L.J. 343, 343 [hereinafter Jailhouse Lawyer] (characterizing jailhouse
lawyers as "a group of knowledgeable inmate practitioners willing to assist their fellow
inmates in the preparation of habeas petitions and other legal papers"). According to the
note, the number ofjailhouse lawyers increased to serve an increasing number of inmates
who were unable to draft their own documents. Id.
80. Complement is the key word here as access to a jailhouse lawyer by itself does not
satisfy the adequate alternative option. Access to updated materials is still essential. See
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
81. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,488 (1969).
82. See Younger, 404 U.S. at 15; Jailhouse Lawyer, supra note 79, at 354-56. Jailhouse
Lawyer was written before the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v. Avery. In questioning
the Sixth Circuit's ruling allowing the prohibition ofjailhouse lawyers, the author posits that
jailhouse lawyers are an essential avenue in guaranteeing indigent, illiterate prisoners
proper access to the courts. Id. The author argues that, although jailhouse lawyers may
contribute to increased disciplinary problems, the State cannot prohibit them if it does not
provide other assistance to prisoners seeking access. Id. at 358-60. Significantly, the Court
cited Jailhouse Lawyer when issuing its opinion. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 487 n.4.
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uneducated prisoners could use sources of legal knowledge effec-
tively without the State having to provide counsel.
2. A State Cannot Fail To Provide a Necessary Component of
Meaningful Access
Based on the preceding discussion, the Lewis Court contradicted
significant right to access precedent when it stated: "But Bounds
established no such right [to a law library or legal assistance] ....
The right that Bounds acknowledged was the (already well-
established) right of access to the courts."8 3 The second part of the
Court's statement is correct; Bounds was based on that Court's
acknowledgment of right to access. The first part of the statement
is wrong, however, as the Bounds Court, while not establishing
the right to a law library or legal assistance, reaffirmed the library
or alternative assistance as necessary components of the right to
access for prisoners. Therefore, when a prisoner alleges inadequate
library facilities or alternative sources of legal knowledge, those
inadequacies, if proven to be true, amount to violations of the right
to meaningful access.
Inadequate law libraries (coupled with the lack of an alter-
native) 4 must be viewed in the same light as a filing fee in divorce
cases 85 and the failure to provide a transcript in criminal appeals.86
As has been discussed previously, the Court has held that state
policies placing a bar to access to the courts are violations of due
process, and in some cases equal protection.87 For all practical
83. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (citations omitted).
84. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd sub noma. Younger v.
Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam). In Gilmore, the district court explained that a
prisoner's inability to become aware of what facts may be legally relevant to a claim destroys
his right to meaningful access. Id. at 110.
85. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
86. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
87. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380-81; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19. The Younger decision shows
that the same equal protection issue evident in Boddie and Griffin could be present in a
prisoner's claim for access to the courts. The district court stated:
Reasonable access to the courts is a constitutional imperative which has been
held to prevail against a variety of state interests. Similarly, the right under
the equalprotection clause of the indigent and uneducated prisoner to the tools
necessary to receive adequate hearing in the courts has received special re-
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purposes, an indigent prisoner without a library is the equivalent
of an indigent married person without sixty dollars to pay a filing
fee for a divorce-neither individual is able to access the court
effectively.8
In the prison context, specifically, failure to provide a law library
is the same thing as the prison not allowing inmates stamps to mail
their petitions. Knowledge of a potential claim is just as necessary
as a stamp for the prisoner's claim to get to court.89 When the Court
has recognized the right to access in a particular context, as they
have for prisoners, the State must operate from the baseline that
neither its action nor inaction can create an absolute bar on access
to the courts.90 This means that it is possible for a state, through
inaction, to violate the Constitution by failing to provide a neces-
sary component of meaningful access, such as a trial transcript or,
as this Note argues, a source of legal knowledge.9' The subsequent
argument will suggest that this characterization of the right to
meaningful access, with a law library or alternative as a necessary
component, alters drastically the Court's decision in Lewis v.
Casey.
92
enforcement by the federal courts in recent decades.
Gilmore, 319 F. Supp. at 109 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).
88. Of course, this Note must show not only that a complete bar has been placed on
access, but also that prisoners, like married couples and criminal appellants, assert
important interests. The Court is obviously not concerned if citizens are not able to access
the courts for inconsequential matters such as being forced to eat unappetizing food. For a
discussion of the interests at play in prisoner litigation, see infra Part III.A.3.
89. See William H. Brooks, Recent Development, Meaningful Access for Indigents on
Death Row: Giarratano v. Murray and the Right to Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings,
43 VAND. L. REV. 569, 573 (1990) ("Some courts and commentators have stated that a
prisoner's most important right is meaningful access to the courts. None of the prisoner's
other constitutional rights has any real meaning without the protection of access to court.").
90. See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 757-62
(1978) (stating that "(t]he crux of the constitutional violation [in Griffin v. Illinois] was not
illegitimate state action but state inaction"). This inaction effectively placed a bar on an
indigent defendant's access to the courts. Id.
91. See id. at 758 (referring to the violation in Griffin as "the absence of an adequate
government subsidy for transcripts"). It is also noteworthy that Professor Frug, shortly after
the Bounds decision, considered that decision to "extendo the transcript and counsel cases
by affirming a district court order requiring North Carolina to provide a law library to state
prisoners in order to ensure protection of the prisoners' 'constitutional right of access to the
courts.'" Id. at 761.
92. See discussion infra Part III.A.4.
1212
NOT SO MEANINGFUL ANYMORE
3. Interest Analysis: A Prisoner's Interest in Reaching the
Courts Compared to Those Interests the Court Has Protected
This Note will now analyze a prisoner's interest in accessing the
courts as compared to the interests of other groups whose access the
Court has protected. The Note will focus on two of a prisoner's most
important claims: habeas corpus and § 1983.
Critics of this Note's argument likely will attempt to distinguish
the right asserted in Lewis from the right asserted in Griffin by
arguing that the interest in access to the courts is greater for a
criminal case. In making this argument, critics will assert that in
almost all cases a prisoner's lawsuit is not criminal and therefore
should not receive the same level of protection that an indigent
criminal appellant receives.93
Although determining the protection of a potential litigant's
access solely on the basis of whether the matter is criminal or civil
may sound appealing, the Supreme Court has explained why it is
not the proper analysis. In M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Supreme Court
focused on the interest involved in the litigation rather than
whether the litigation was criminal or civil in nature.94
The Court in M.L.B. found that a state could not bar access to the
courts for "appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence on
which the trial court found [petitioner] unfit to remain a parent."
95
M.L.B had challenged Mississippi's requirement that she pay a
preparation fee of over $2000 to appeal the trial court's termination
of her parental rights.96 While focusing on the interests involved,
the M.L.B. Court found that not only was the Griffin decision still
viable, but that it extended beyond criminal cases where the
defendant/appellant was not facing incarceration. 97 The Court cited
93. See J.T. Price, Recent Development, The Supreme Court of the United States, 1996
Term: An Improper Extension of Civil Litigation By Indigents: M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117S. Ct. 555
(1996), 20HARv.J.L. & PUB. POLY 905,905-06 (1997) (asserting that the "Supreme Court has
long differentiated between criminal and civil cases in terms of a State's duty" to guarantee
access to the courts).
94. 519 U.S. 102, 119-21 (1996).
95. Id. at 107.
96. Id. at 106-07.
97. See id. at 110-12.
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to Mayer v. City of Chicago, which held that a state could not block
a petty offender's access to the courts.98
The M.L.B. Court then analyzed "a narrow category of civil
cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial pro-
cesses without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees."99 After
discussing the aforementioned Boddie, the Court focused on the
decision in United States v. Kras °° in attempting to explain which
interests were worthy of the Court's protection from an absolute bar
to the courts.
Kras involved a fee that was necessary to obtain a discharge in
a bankruptcy proceeding. 10 1 The Court refused to require waiver of
the fee because the bankruptcy discharge did not involve a
"fundamental interest."0 2 The factors critical to the Court's
determination that bankruptcy discharge was not a "fundamental
interest," for which access to the courts should be guaranteed, were:
(1) the interest a debtor has in being able to have a "new start in
life" is not equivalent to the interest a couple has in starting or
ending a marriage, and (2) unlike marriage and divorce, a debtor
has alternative avenues of achieving his interests without access to
the courts." 3 The Court emphasized that "[glaining or not gaining
a discharge will effect no change with respect to basic necessi-
ties." 04
Applying the Supreme Court precedent discussed in this section
of the Note demonstrates that the Court should protect prisoners
from a complete bar to court access. This should become apparent
when comparing a prisoner's interest in habeas corpus and § 1983
claims to those interests at play in Griffin, Boddie, M.L.B., and
Kras.
Examining a prisoner's interest in habeas corpus shows similari-
ties between the interest of a prisoner and the interest of a criminal
98. See 404 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971).
99. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113-16.
100. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
101. See id. at 435-36.
102. See id. at 445.
103. See id. at 445-46 (noting that even if "Kras is not discharged in bankruptcy, his
position will not be materially altered in any constitutional sense" as well as the other
options available to a debtor).
104. Id. at 445.
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appellant in Griffin. In both situations the litigant has been
deprived of liberty, which is unquestionably a fundamental interest.
Also, both the criminal appeal' °5 and writ of habeas corpus' serve
a similar function in providing a check to ensure that the litigant
has not been improperly deprived of liberty.
Although a habeas petition may be different than a direct appeal
in that it comes after the prisoner already has had several bites at
the apple, the interest underlying the petition is still correcting a
false deprivation of liberty. This interest makes the prisoner's
litigation more like Griffin and M.L.B. than Kras. Whereas failure
to achieve a discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding would not
"materially alter[] [Kras' interests] in any constitutional sense," 07
the same cannot be said for the prisoner seeking relief from
unconstitutional confinement. Unlike a discharge in a bankruptcy
proceeding, freedom from unconstitutional confinement addresses
one of a person's "basic necessities."'08
Also, the resolution of a prisoner's habeas petition can be
obtained only through access to the courts. Because the courts are
the sole means of redress, a prisoner's interest in a habeas petition
more resembles Boddie, Griffin, and M.L.B. than it does Kras. o9
Even though § 1983 claims do not involve the issue of deprivation
of liberty, one could argue that these claims could involve a
fundamental interest, placing the right to access in that "narrow
category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its
judicial process [. " "o For instance, a prisoner could assert that the
conditions of confinement, such as overcrowding, create grounds
for a claim that the State is subjecting him to "cruel and unusual
punishment.""' One would think that interests having a close
relationship to the express protections of the Constitution would
105. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (asserting "the importance of appellate
review to a correct adjudication of guilt or innocence").
106. See Barry Friedman, FailedEnterprise" The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 485, 488 (1995) (averring that habeas corpus serves the purposes of "vindicating
constitutional rights, deterring violation of those rights in future cases, and perhaps ensuring
that punishment is only afforded to those deserving of it").
107. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445.
108. See id.
109. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
110. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 113 (1996).
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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have satisfied the M.L.B. Court's interest analysis. Unlike Kras, a
petitioner alleging prison overcrowding is not merely looking for a
"new start in life."' 12 Rather, he is asserting his constitutional right
against cruel and unusual punishment.
Because the interests at play in prisoner litigation are of
fundamental importance, a state should not be able effectively to
bar prisoners from reaching the courts to assert those interests. The
position is strengthened by the fact that access to the courts is the
sole avenue for redressing the claimed infringement of these
interests.
4. Adequacy: A Discernable Standard
Aside from the two arguments of the Lewis Court and potential
criticisms. mentioned above," 3 opponents of a right to access that
necessarily includes an adequate law library or alternative would
argue that determining what is adequate would be a difficult, if
not impossible task, and certainly more trouble than it is worth.
This is not a legitimate concern, since both courts in charge of
remedying Bounds violations, and the people in charge of providing
prisoners with the materials to ensure that Bounds violations did
not occur, were able to perform their functions properly." 4
As more and more inmates began to invoke the right to an
adequate law library (or alternative), the courts were able to flesh
112. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445.
113. See supra notes 67-68, 71, 78 and accompanying text (discussing the Lewis Court's
beliefs that a law library had never been recognized as essential in and of itself, and that
requiring a law library would be wasteful as prisoners would not be able to make use of it).
114. See, e.g., Petrick v. Maynard, 11 F.3d 991, 994-96 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
failure to provide an inmate with legal materials necessary to attack his conviction is a
violation of meaningful access); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517,521 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that free photocopying is not essential to meaningful access). For a discussion of prison law
librarians following the Bounds standard, see Karen Westwood, "Meaningful Access to the
Courts" and Law Libraries: Where Are We Now?, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 193, 194-95 (1998) (noting
that although prison law librarians had to wait to see what the courts deemed adequate in
order to meet the Bounds standard, the librarians had become used to working with the
standard in the time between Bounds and Lewis). The article goes on to suggest that the
Lewis decision provides law librarians with a new standard to which they will have to adjust.
Id. at 196.
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out the meaning of the term "adequate." '15 Courts developed this
aspect of right to access jurisprudence by approving or rejecting
individual prison policies. The reason for defining such a general
term a piece at a time was the broad discretion the Bounds Court
gave to states to determine what was "adequate.""' Although
defining "adequate" by examining individual policies required a
wait-and-see mentality for those in charge of providing adequate
access,"' the courts were effective in developing a definition of the
limits of the term.
The above discussion shows that courts, in the time between
Bounds and Lewis, were able to contribute to the definition of the
term "adequate" by either approving or rejecting a prison's attempt
to provide "adequate" access. This proved to be an effective process
for ensuring that states were allowed maximum discretion in
meeting the standards of adequacy, while providing officials and
librarians with a workable standard."18
B. Lewis and Standing: Access Denied
1. Standing Analysis: Viewing the Right to Access as
Necessarily Including a Law Library or Adequate Alternative
If the right to meaningful access for prisoners necessarily
includes a law library or adequate alternative, as this Note has
115. See, e.g., Blake v. Berman, 877 F.2d 145, 146, 148 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that
screening of a claim by a legal aid program is not essential to meet Bounds adequacy
requirement); Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a
bookmobile service accompanied by minimal assistance from local law students was not
adequate to ensure meaningful access); Spates v. Manson, 619 F.2d 204, 205-08 (2d Cir.
1980) (discussing certain volumes a prison library needs in order to be deemed adequate).
116. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832-33 (1977) (explaining that "[pirison
administrators ... exercised wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional requirements"
for a prisoner's meaningful access to the courts). The Court addressed the issue of local
discretion in refuting prison administrators' claims that "federal courts should not 'sit as co-
administrators of state prisons.'" Id. at 832. While admitting that judicial restraint is often
appropriate in prisoner rights litigation, the Court stated that the judicial restraint "cannot
encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims." Id. (quoting
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
117. See Westwood, supra note 114, at 194.
118. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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argued," 9 then the Court's standing analysis is severely flawed and
unnecessary. 120 Characterizing the right in this way, as including
a law library or adequate alternative, means the State directly
violates a prisoner's right to access when one of these two options
is not present. Using the injury analysis described earlier, 12 1 it is
apparent that when operating under the proper characterization of
the right to access, the Lewis plaintiffs must have had standing.
The Lewis plaintiffs alleged that the government was "depriving
[respondents] of their rights of access to the courts and counsel
protected by First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments." 22 The
basis of that argument was the presence of an inadequate library
system, 12 something to which, as this Note has argued, prisoners
have a right in order to make their access to the system meaningful.
This fits squarely into the infringement on individual liberty that
Professor Chemerinsky discussed when describing injuries suffi-
cient to warrant standing.
24
Arguments that this type of injury is too generalized should fail
as well. When a court has denied plaintiffs standing because the
harm they allege is too generalized, the question a court always
asks is: Does the alleged infringement affect the plaintiff any
differently than it does a large segment of the rest of the popula-
tion?125 Examination of the claims brought by the prisoners shows
that they are not too generalized, despite the fact that the class
119. See supra Part III.A.
120. The Court in Lewis admitted that its standing analysis would have been different if
it had viewed a law library or adequate alternative as necessary. See Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (stating that the "foregoing analysis would not be pertinent here if, as
respondents seem to assume, the right at issue-the right to which the actual or threatened
harm must pertain-were the right to a law library or legal assistance").
121. See supra Part II (discussing that courts consider a plaintiff "injured" for standing
purposes if the government has infringed upon an "individual liberty" that is not too
generalized).
122. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346 (citation omitted).
123. See id.
124. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 2.5.3, at 69.
125. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975) ("[W]hen the asserted harm is a
'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction."). For an
example of a court applying this analysis, see Shaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017
(D. Colo. 1999) (holding that a person does not have standing to sue when they allege
generalized grievances experienced by all federal taxpayers).
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action was brought "on behalf of all adult prisoners who are or
will be incarcerated by the State of Arizona Department of Correc-
tions."126 Prisoners are by no means a large segment of the popula-
tion, and certainly not on scale with a group like federal taxpayers.
Rather, prisoners are a smaller group, who uniquely experience the
government's infringement on liberty. In these situations, the
courts have consistently conferred standing. 127
As this Note has already argued, to be meaningful a prisoner's
access to the courts must include a law library or alternative.
128
This means that the inadequacy of a library is a constitutional
infringement on a prisoner's individual liberty-an infringement
imperative for the courts to remedy. 129 As this direct infringement
on the right to meaningful access is uniquely experienced by
prisoners, the court clearly has standing in cases in which prisoners
allege an inadequate law library or alternative.
2. Standing Analysis: Even if a Law Library Is Not Viewed as a
Necessary Component to the Right To Access
Even when working from the Court's improper baseline, which
construes the right to access narrowly, the standing decision in
Lewis v. Casey is still incorrect.
a. Background: The Real Reasoning Behind the Standing
Decision in Lewis v. Casey
The Court has often been criticized for manipulating standing
doctrine to achieve goals consistent with its members' political or
126. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346 (citation omitted).
127. See, e.g., Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 573 F. Supp. 586,
590 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that a taxpayers' claim is not too generalized where they allege
"a particular harm not shared by the population in general").
128. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing that a proper construction of meaningful
access includes a law library).
129. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (asserting that prisoners without adequate
legal resources are effectively barred from accessing the courts, as there is no way for them
to be aware of certain civil rights claims or laws that would allow them to challenge their
convictions).
2004] 1219
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
societal values.3 0 One scholar asserts that the Justices' political
preferences often allow for a political scientist to predict the
outcome of cases, in which the decision rests on standing, without
any detailed knowledge of standing law.1"' Another scholar has
focused on the Court's use of standing to keep the "little guy" out of
court. 3 2 Because standing doctrine is manipulated so commonly to
achieve a desired result, it is appropriate to scrutinize the Court's
standing decisions."'
b. Standing in Lewis Reexamined: Plaintiffs Suffered Actual
Injury
A comparison of the Lewis Court's injury analysis with injury
analysis in other cases shows that the Lewis decision was or may
have been based on something other than sound constitutional
precedent. Based on the Court's decisions in other areas of stand-
ing, particularly antidiscrimination,'" one must conclude that the
Lewis prisoners were actually injured for the purposes of standing.
The Court's injury analysis in Lewis appears particularly
obnoxious when compared with how the Court has construed injury
for white contractors challenging set-aside programs for minorities.
As Gene Nichol states, "[t ]he Supreme Court's racial set-aside cases
130. See generally Nichol, supra note 11; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or
Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999).
131. Pierce, supra note 129, at 1754-55. The author states that
[a) political scientist with no knowledge of the law of standing would have had
no difficulty predicting the outcome of each case and predicting thirty-one of the
thirty-three votes cast by Justices with clear ideological preferences, based
solely on his knowledge of the ideological preferences of the Justices.
Id. It is noteworthy that Lewis v. Casey was one of the cases included in this analysis. Id. at
1750-51.
132. See Nichol, supra note 11, at 304 (arguing that "the injury standard is not only
unstable and inconsistent, but that it also systematically favors the powerful over the
powerless").
133. This is especially important when, as in Lewis, the Court mixes the discussion of
standing and the merits of the case together. In Lewis, the mixing of standing decisions with
the merits of a claim led to questionable decisions on both grounds. See supra Part III.A.
(discussing the merits of the Lewis decision); infra Part III.B.2.b-c (discussing standing).
134. See Nichol, supra note 11, at 311 ("The Supreme Court, in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke and other racial affirmative action cases, has permitted challenges to
admissions programs even when the particular plaintiff ... believes that a program has
harmed him, even if, in fact, it has not.").
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have ... based standing on purported 'barriers' to access faced by
white contractors. This is so even if the roadblocks are merely
theoretical-since the plaintiffs do not need to show that they would
have obtained contracts but for the set-asides."135
Federal courts have consistently applied the principle Nichol
described. As such, they have held repeatedly that whites challeng-
ing set-aside programs do not have to show that they actually would
have received the job or the promotion but for the set-aside. 136
Because courts that have allowed standing in set-aside cases have
based their injury analysis on the fact that the government has
barred access to something (in this case, the opportunity to compete
for a job), with no concern for whether the plaintiff would have been
successful had he or she had access to what they were seeking, 137
these cases are virtually identical to Lewis.
In both Lewis and the set-aside cases, the plaintiffs argued that
the government had created a barrier, preventing the plaintiffs
from having access to a constitutional right. It is unreasonable for
the Court to say that the prisoners "must go one step further"138 by
proving that they would have had a successful claim, while not
requiring contractors to show that they would have made the
winning bid on the job in question. In arguing that the Supreme
Court's application of injury analysis has been absurd, Nichol
compares the injury analysis in Lewis to an injury in an affirmative
action case. Nichol observes:
If the Court had required Alan Bakke to meet this version of
concrete injury he would have had to prove not only that he
would have been admitted to the Cal-Davis medical school, but
that he also had a high-paying job waiting for him and had been
accepted into membership at the country club.13 1
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See, e.g., N.E. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656 (1993) (holding that standing was satisfied by general contractors challenging a set-
aside program); Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that white
police officers could challenge a promotion program without showing that they would have
been promoted but for the program).
137. See N.E. Fla. Contractors, 508 U.S. at 666; Nichol, supra note 11, at 311.
138. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
139. Nichol, supra note 11, at 329.
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Viewing Lewis and the set-aside/affirmative action cases to-
gether shows that even if one does not accept the argument that a
right to a law library or alternative is essential to the right to
meaningful access, a prisoner who has been deprived of such
things has suffered an injury for the purposes of standing. The
Lewis Court was wrong in requiring the prisoners to go "one step
further"14 ° by alleging a successful claim when the prisoners had
gone as far as the set-aside plaintiffs in alleging that the State had
denied them the opportunity to compete. 4 ' According to the set-
aside cases, one need not show that they would win that competi-
tion in order to demonstrate standing. Making the Lewis injury
analysis compatible with the injury analysis in the Court's other
decisions is essential to reforming what has produced what scholars
have called absurd results.'42
c. Standing in Lewis Reexamined: Even if Plaintiffs
Experienced No Actual Injury, Harm /Injury Was Imminent
The Court's injury analysis in Lewis is wrong even if one denies
the fact that plaintiffs had suffered an injury in fact.44 A plaintiff
may satisfy the injury requirement of standing if he or she is able
to allege that injury is imminent. 144
The plaintiff in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons failed because, in the
Court's view, he did not "credibly allege that he faced a realistic
threat from the future application of the City's policy."14 The Court
140. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
141. Competing for a job must be viewed in the same light as competing for a favorable
resolution to a court claim. In both cases not having the opportunity to compete for
something causes the injury.
142. See Nichol, supra note 11, at 338-39 (arguing that "[tihe injury inquiry should
embrace a significant presumption in favor of the plaintiffs claim .... A generous
predisposition towards finding injury would also go far to dismantle the artificial categories
of injury that have rendered the Court's standingjurisprudence one of the most manipulated,
result-oriented arenas of constitutional law"). See generally Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law
of Standing: A Plea For Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977) (describing the
appropriate injury standard as plaintiff-friendly).
143. Of course, as this Note has argued, the plaintiffs in Lewis alleged an actual injury
when they claimed that the state of Arizona infringed on their right to have an adequate law
library or alternative to make their access to the courts meaningful.
144. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 4, § 2.5.3, at 66-69.
145. 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.7 (1983).
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determined that the probability that Lyons would be illegally
injured by a police chokehold again was very low, and no greater
than any other citizen of Los Angeles. 146 Significantly, the Court's
statement links the imminency of injury to plaintiffs to whether
the claim is too generalized. This is a significant distinction, as a
population of prisoners-a distinct group from the general pop-
ulation-are all uniquely affected by the violation alleged in
Lewis.'47 Because Arizona's prison law library policy uniquely
affects prisoners, the Court must accept the argument that, unlike
Lyons, injury was substantially more imminent for the Lewis
plaintiffs than the general population.
The Lewis plaintiffs' injury is also distinguishable from Lyons
because there is a realistic threat of future harm in Lewis. One
reason for the Court's determination that Lyons had failed to allege
imminent harm was that a future application of a chokehold would
require first that the plaintiff have a direct encounter with the
police-something that happens infrequently-and, second, that the
plaintiff would resist the authority of the police. 4 ' While incarcer-
ated, a prisoner encounters prison guards and conditions that may
violate his civil rights every hour of every day. Assault and sexual
abuse within prisons are major problems that prisoners face on a
continuous basis.149 Without access to legal materials or assistance
providing prisoners with the tools to bring these claims in a timely
fashion, it is inevitable that prisoners miss out on claims-though
not necessarily successful claims-that should have been heard on
the merits will not have the opportunity to present them.
146. See id. at 111 ("Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a
similar way, Lyons is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen in Los
Angeles...."). It should be noted that the Court's decision in Lyons has received substantial
criticism for its strict standard. See Christopher v. Dep't of Highway Safety, 209 F. Supp. 2d
1290, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (agreeing that Lyons "render[s] [the federal courts] impotent to
order the cessation of a policy which may indeed be unconstitutional and harm many
persons.") (quoting Williams v. City of Chicago, 609 F. Supp. 1017, 1020 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1985));
Nichol, supra note 11, at 328-29.
147. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
148. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06.
149. See Gerald G. Gaes, The Effects of Overcrowding in Prison, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 95, 127-34 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1985)
(explaining how overcrowding in prisons has led to an increase in the number of assault
reports).
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IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
A. Equitable Tolling
As argued previously throughout this Note, there are a number
of reasons why the Lewis Court erred in deciding that prisoners did
not have standing. The consequences of the error are severe. 150 One
of the major problems for inmates without adequate access is the
loss of a claim due to the passing of the statute of limitations.' The
solution to this problem is a system of equitable tolling, which
allows prisoners to file a claim, allegedly frustrated by inadequate
legal materials, after the statutory period has expired.
Equitable tolling has been used in other areas of prisoner
litigation,"' and is similar to what would be allowed under the
standard the Lewis majority posited.'53 Although allowing equitable
tolling addresses a major area of concern in a prisoner's access to
the courts, it still assumes too much to provide adequate protection.
Equitable tolling assumes that all those who have a claim will
become aware of that claim, even if this awareness comes after the
statute of limitations. The question remains as to what happens to
those who never become aware of a claim due to inadequate
libraries or legal assistance.
B. Injunctive Relief Back to Bounds
Because of the concerns remaining even with a system of
equitable tolling in place, some type of injunctive relief is necessary
150. See supra Part III (arguing that the Court's failure to recognize the proper scope of
the right to access effectively prevents many challenges to a state policy that places an
absolute bar on access to the courts for a certain group of prisoners).
151. This is the type of proceduralltechnical failure that Justice Scalia contemplated. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
152. See, e.g., McLester v. Hopper, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1308,1310 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (stating that
equitable tolling is allowed in habeas corpus cases in almost all circuits, and will be allowed
in the Eleventh Circuit when plaintiff shows that an "inequitable event" prevents him from
filing in accordance with the statute of limitations).
153. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (stating that a prisoner must show his complaint was
dismissed "for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies
in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known").
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to provide an appropriate remedy for the right to access. 154 In order
truly to remedy the violation of the right to access by failure to
provide a law library or meaningful alternative, a continuing
violation of the Constitution, the Court must strike down either
policy or government action causing the violation. 155
Because the right (right to access), the type of infringement (a
barrier to that access), and the interests at play are substantially
similar in Lewis, Bounds, Griffin, Boddie, and M.L.B. , the prisoners
in Lewis should have been granted injunctive relief if they were able
to show that a policy of the State caused the barrier to access.
Indigent prisoners in Lewis are no different than indigent married
couples or indigent criminal defendants. 5 6
It is important, however, that the injunctive relief is not overly
broad, potentially taking away necessary deference from local
officials.5 7 Although the injunctive relief overturned in Lewis may
have been too broad, that does not mean that a court cannot issue
injunctive relief in a manner that gives the right to access the
protection it deserves, while at the same time respecting local
control over prisons.'58
154. Injunctive relief is also an appropriate remedy for a violation of the right which this
Note has characterized above-a right to access, including a right to a law library or
meaningful alternative. This was also the remedy chosen by the Supreme Court in
Boddie and Griffin to address the denial of meaningful access in those cases.
155. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956). In these cases the Court struck down the policy presenting the barrier instead ofjust
allowing tolling or addressing an individual case. For example, Griffin went beyond
hypothetically saying, "Okay Mr. Griffin, you may file and you may have a transcript for your
appeal." Rather, the Court essentially enjoined the State from charging indigent prisoners
for appellate transcripts. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19-20.
156. A policy that denies a prisoner proper access to file a petition for habeas corpus is
particularly analogous to a policy that denies access to a criminal appeal because the result
of each policy is to deprive the petitioner of their opportunity to avoid their criminal
punishment.
157. This Note does not contest Justice Scalia's argument that in fashioning the injunctive
relief, the Ninth Circuit overstepped its authority and took necessary deference away from
state officials. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361-63 (1996).
158. Bounds exemplifies this type of injunction. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832
(1977) (allowing local administrators to experiment in finding a system that suits their needs
while achieving "compliance with constitutional standards"). Justice Scalia even admitted
that the Bounds Court properly considered traditional deference to local authorities when
crafting the injunction. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52 (explaining the Bounds Court's
mention of the possibility for "local experimentation" in ensuring a prisoner's right to access
the courts is satisfied) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Until Lewis, the Supreme Court had established a right to access
for prisoners that was meaningful and compatible with the way the
right had been defined in other contexts. With a guaranteed right
to a law library or adequate alternative of legal assistance, the
Bounds Court ensured the equal protection of indigent prisoners.'59
In making its provision, Bounds realized that without a law library
or adequate alternative indigent prisoners were effectively barred
from accessing the judicial system. Bounds was based not only on
a long line of decisions in the prisoner rights context, 0 but also was
consistent with Supreme Court precedent applying to other indigent
groups seeking a right to access.
Demonstrating this consistency are Boddie v. Connecticut and
Griffin v. Illinois, important precedents for the Court's use of the
Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate state policies that placed a
bar on an indigent's right to have meaningful access to the courts.
In these cases, the Court found that laws or policies that had the
effect of preventing married couples seeking divorce or convicted
criminals seeking appeals from gaining access to the courts because
of their indigence were violative of both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 '
As this Note has discussed, the interests involved in prisoner
litigation are comparable to those that have been afforded protec-
tion in other contexts. '62 Habeas claims involving deprivation of
liberty and § 1983 claims invoking the Eighth Amendment are two
examples of litigation in which precedent would seem to dictate
protection of access to the courts.
The Lewis decision shattered both the meaningfulness and
compatibility that existed in this area of the Court's jurisprudence.
Without a law library or meaningful alternative, prisoners without
the means to hire attorneys are essentially barred from accessing
the courts. This result opposes the crux of meaningful access
159. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825 (explaining the importance of the right to access to indigent
prisoners).
160. See supra Part I.B.1.
161. See supra Part I.A.
162. See supra Part III.A.3.
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jurisprudence: that the government may not, directly or indirectly,
place a bar on access to the courts.1
6 3
Furthermore, the Court developed a new actual injury require-
ment that is inappropriate even under the Lewis majority's belief
that meaningful access does not include a prisoner's right to a law
library.1" This enhanced injury requirement also took away the
ability for courts to fashion appropriate relief for a right to access
violation.165 This Note has demonstrated the unsound footing on
which Lewis relies. Because Lewis was incorrectly decided, the
Court must reconsider the question and bring the meaningfulness
back to meaningful access.
Joseph A. Schouten
163. See supra Part I.B.1.
164. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
165. See supra Part IV.B (explaining the necessity of injunctive relief).
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